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Knowing Whether
Jie Fan, Yanjing Wang∗, Hans van Ditmarsch
Abstract
Knowing whether a proposition is true means knowing that it is true or knowing that it is false.
In this paper, we study logics with a modal operator Kw for knowing whether but without a modal
operator K for knowing that. This logic is not a normal modal logic, because we do not have
Kw(ϕ → ψ) → (Kwϕ → Kwψ). Knowing whether logic cannot define many common frame
properties, and its expressive power is less than that of basic modal logic over classes of models
without reflexivity. These features make axiomatizing knowing whether logics non-trivial. We
axiomatize knowing whether logic over various frame classes. We also present an extension of
knowing whether logic with public announcement operators and we give corresponding reduction
axioms for that. We compare our work in detail to two recent similar proposals.
Keywords: non-normal modal logic, completeness, public announcement, expressivity, epistemic lo-
gic
1 Introduction
The work entitled ‘Logics of public communication’ by Plaza [Pla89]1 is mainly known as one of
the founding publications, if not the founding publication, of public announcement logic. However,
it also treats two other topics worthy of investigation, namely ‘knowing value’ modal operators and
their binary variant ‘knowing whether’ modal operators. You know the pincode of your bankcard
if you know the value of it. You know whether p if you know that p is true or you know that p is
false. Plaza demonstrates the use of these operators in his discussion of Sum-and-Product puzzle, and
poses as an open question what the axiomatization would be of public announcement logic with these
operators [Pla89, p.13]. In [WF13], the authors investigate knowing value operators in depth and
give a complete axiomatization of the logic with knowing value and public announcement, where the
knowing value modality behaves quite differently from a modality in a normal modal logic, such as
the standard knowledge modality. Unlike the knowing value modality, knowing whether is definable
in terms of knowing that. But it still seems interesting to investigate a logic with a knowing whether
operator but without the usual knowledge operator, and this motivates this paper.
Knowing whether operators have been discussed in other settings in the logical literature. [HHS96]
uses ‘knowing whether’ operator to establish a continuum of knowledge states in a very neat fashion,
which demonstrates that ‘knowing whether’ is more convenient to use than ‘knowing that’ in certain
contexts, as argued also in [HS93]. In natural language ‘knowing whether’ is frequently used instead
of ‘knowing that’. You say: “I know whether it is raining outside,” but you do not say: “I know that
it is raining outside or I know that it is not raining outside.” We often only need to know whether
∗Corresponding author
1Reprinted as [Pla07] with comments by [vD07].
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someone knows the truth value of something, rather than the truth value itself. For example, a con-
ference organizer needs to make sure that he knows whether the invited participants will come: it
is fine for him as long as a definitive confirmation is given. An analysis in inquisitive semantics of
such natural expressions is found in [AEJ13]. For another example, consider the Muddy Children
Puzzle [MDH86]. By iterating the announcement of the formula “nobody knows whether he or she
is muddy,” this formula will finally become false, i.e., the muddy children will finally learn that they
are muddy. This can be succinctly said in a logic with knowing whether and public announcements
as primitives. Finally, consider gossip protocols [HHL88], wherein processors (or ‘agents’) exchange
information by one-to-one communications (‘calls’) wherein they exchange the value of their local
state. We can assume the information to be exchanged are propositional secrets which have binary
values. If p describes the secret of agent 1, then after agent 2 calls agent 1, both 1 and 2 know whether
p. Whether the value is true or false is irrelevant for the design of such protocols.
The logic of knowing whether has also appeared in a different form in prior literature, namely as
the logic of ignorance [vdHL03, vdHL04, Ste08]: you are ignorant about a proposition iff you do
not know whether the proposition is true. An axiomatization of the logic of ignorance over the class
of arbitrary frames is given in [vdHL03, vdHL04]. The authors suggest that it is hard to repeat this
exercise for other frame classes. In this work, we advance the study of knowing whether logic by
systematically axiomatizing knowing whether logic over various common frame classes. We discuss
in detail the difference between [vdHL03, vdHL04, Ste08] and our results.
Knowing whether logic is not a normal modal logic, it cannot define common frame properties,
and it is less expressive than the basic modal logic, although equally expressive on reflexive models.
We give a complete axiomatization, and also various extensions for special frame classes, and an
addition of the logic with public announcements.
In Section 2 we define the language and semantics of the logic of knowing whether. Section 3
deals with expressivity over models and frames, and Section 4 presents our new axiomatization of
the logic over the class of arbitrary frames and proves its completeness. Then, in Section 5 we give
axiomizations for other frame classes—highly non-trivial in this setting, as frame properties are not
definable, unlike in standard modal logic. In Section 6 we extend knowing whether logic with public
announcements, and in Section 7 we discuss the literature on the logic of ignorance in relation to our
results.
2 Syntax and semantics of the logic of knowing whether
We define the logical language in a more general setting including knowing whether but also know-
ledge. However, we will focus on the language with only knowing whether.
Definition 1 (Logical languages PLKwK, PLKw and EL). Let a set P of propositional variables and
a set I of agents be given. The logical language PLKwK(P, I) is defined as:
ϕ ::= ⊤ | p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | Kwiϕ | Kiϕ
where p ∈ P and i ∈ I. Without the Kiϕ construct, we have the language PLKw(P, I) of knowing
whether logic. Without the Kwiϕ construct, we have the language EL(P, I) of epistemic logic.
We typically omit the parameters P and I from the notations for these languages. The formula
Kiϕ stands for ‘agent i knows that ϕ,’ although we do not restrict ourselves to an epistemic context.
The formula Kwiϕ stands for ‘agent i knows whether ϕ’. As usual, we define ⊥, (ϕ ∨ ψ), (ϕ → ψ),
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(ϕ↔ ψ) as the abbreviations of, respectively, ¬⊤, ¬(¬ϕ∧¬ψ), (¬ϕ∨ψ), and ((ϕ→ ψ)∧(ψ → ϕ)).
We omit parentheses from formulas unless confusion results. In particular, we assume that ∧ and ∨
bind stronger than → and ↔. For ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕm we write
∧m
j=1 ϕj , and for ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ϕm we write∨m
j=1 ϕj .
Definition 2 (Model). A model is a triple M = 〈S, {→i| i ∈ I}, V 〉 where S is a non-empty set
of possible worlds, →i is a binary relation over S for each i ∈ I, and V is a valuation function
assigning a set of worlds V (p) ⊆ S to each p ∈ P. Given a world s ∈ S, a pair (M, s) is a pointed
model. A frame is a pair F = 〈S, {→i| i ∈ I}〉, i.e., a model without a valuation. We will refer to
special classes of models or frames using the notation below. A binary relation is partial-functional
iff it corresponds to a partial function, i.e., every world has at most one successor.
Notation Frame Property
K —
D seriality
T reflexivity
B symmetry
4 transitivity
5 euclidicity
45 transitivity, euclidicity
S4 reflexivity, transitivity
S5 reflexivity, euclidicity
PF partial functionality
We will omit parenthesis around pointed models (M, s) whenever convenient. The non-standard
notion of partial functionality plays a special role in knowing whether logics.
Definition 3 (Semantics). Given a model M = 〈S, {→i| i ∈ I}, V 〉, the semantics of PLKwK is
defined as follows:
M, s  ⊤ ⇔ always
M, s  p ⇔ s ∈ V (p)
M, s  ¬ϕ ⇔ M, s 2 ϕ
M, s  ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔ M, s  ϕ and M, s  ψ
M, s  Kwiϕ ⇔ for all t1, t2 such that s→i t1, s→i t2 :
(M, t1  ϕ⇔M, t2  ϕ)
M, s  Kiϕ ⇔ for all t such that s→i t :M, t  ϕ
If M, s  ϕ we say that ϕ is true in (M, s), and sometimes write s  ϕ if M is clear; if for all s in
M we have M, s  ϕ we say that ϕ is valid on M and write M  ϕ; if for all M based on F with
M  ϕ we say that ϕ is valid on F and write F  ϕ; if for all F with F  ϕ, ϕ is valid and we
write  ϕ. Given Φ ⊆ PLKwK, M, s |= Φ stands for ‘for all ϕ ∈ Φ, M, s |= ϕ,’ and similarly for
model/frame validity, and validity. If there exists an (M, s) such that M, s  ϕ, then ϕ is satisfiable.
Intuitively, Kwiϕ is true at s if and only if ϕ has the same truth value on the worlds that i thinks
possible. Knowing whether logic is not normal, because Kwi(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Kwiϕ→ Kwiψ) is invalid
(and, in relation to that,  ϕ→ ψ does not imply  Kwiϕ→ Kwiψ). In the countermodel M1 below
we have that M1, s  Kwi(p→ q) and M1, s  Kwip, but M1, s 2 Kwiq.
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M1 : s : ¬p,¬q

// ¬p, q
We use ϕ[ψ/p] to denote a uniform substitution of ϕ, i.e., the formula obtained by replacing all
occurrences of p in ϕ (if there is any) with ψ. It can be shown that uniform substitution preserves the
validity of PLKw-formulas.
Proposition 4. For any ψ,ϕ ∈ PLKw, any p ∈ P: if  ϕ, then  ϕ[ψ/p].
Proof. We show the contrapositive, namely that 2 ϕ[ψ/p] implies 2 ϕ. Assume a pointed model
(M, s) such that M, s 2 ϕ[ψ/p], where M = 〈S, {→i| i ∈ I}, V 〉. Consider model M′ that is as M
but with valuation V ′, where V ′(p) = {t ∈ S | M, t |= ψ}. We show that for all χ and for all s in the
domain of M: M, s  χ[ψ/p] iff M′, s  χ, by induction on χ. The only non-trivial case is Kwiχ.
M, s  Kwiχ[ψ/p] iff
for all s1, s2 such that s→i s1, s→i s2 :M, s1  χ[ψ/p] iff M, s2  χ[ψ/p] iff (by induction)
for all s1, s2 such that s→i s1, s→i s2 :M′, s1  χ iff M′, s2  χ iff
M′, s  Kwiχ
Therefore, from M, s 2 ϕ[ψ/p] follows M′, s 2 ϕ, and therefore 2 ϕ, as desired.
3 Expressivity and frame correspondence
In this section we compare the relative expressivity of knowing whether logic and epistemic logic,
and we give some negative results for frame correspondence for knowing whether logic.
3.1 Expressivity
We adopt the definition of expressivity in [vDvdHK07, Def.8.2].
Definition 5 (Expressive). Given two logical languages L1 and L2 that are interpreted in the same
class of models,
• L2 is at least as expressive as L1, notation L1  L2, if and only if for every formula ϕ1 ∈ L1
there is a formula ϕ2 ∈ L2 such that ϕ1 ⇔ ϕ2 (i.e., ϕ1 and ϕ2 are logically equivalent).
• L1 and L2 are equally expressive, notation L1 ≡ L2, if and only if L1  L2 and L2  L1.
• L1 is less expressive than L2, notation L1 ≺ L2, if and only if L1  L2 and L2 6 L1.
Proposition 6. PLKw is less expressive than EL on the class of K models, D-models, 4-models,
5-models.
Proof. This is a truth-preserving translation t from PLKw to EL:
t(p) = p
t(¬ϕ) = ¬t(ϕ)
t(ϕ ∧ ψ) = t(ϕ) ∧ t(ψ)
t(Kwiϕ) = Kit(ϕ) ∨ Ki¬t(ϕ)
Therefore EL is at least as expressive as PLKw. But PLKw is not at least as expressive as EL:
even the simplest EL formula Kip does not have an equivalent PLKw correspondent. The pointed
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models (M, s) and (N , t) below, which are distinguished by Kip, cannot be distinguished by a PLKw
formula.
M : s : p // p

N : t : p // ¬p

Note that M and N are serial, transitive, and Euclidean. By induction we prove that M, s and
N , t are modally equivalent in PLKw. The non-trivial case is ϕ = Kwiψ. Note that s and t can only
see one point. Therefore, M, s  Kwiψ and N , t  Kwiψ, so also, as required, M, s  Kwiψ iff
N , t  Kwiψ.
Proposition 7. PLKw is less expressive than EL on the class of B-models.
Proof. Consider the following B-models (M′, s′) and (N ′, t′). Again, they are distinguished by Kip,
but are modally equivalent in PLKw (by a similar argument as in Prop. 6).
M′ : s′ : p // poo N ′ : t′ : p // ¬poo
However, on the class of T -models, PLKw and EL are equally expressive.
Proposition 8. PLKw and EL are equally expressive on the class of T -models.
Proof. Consider translation t′ : EL → PLKw:
t′(p) = p
t′(¬ϕ) = ¬t′(ϕ)
t′(ϕ ∧ ψ) = t′(ϕ) ∧ t′(ψ)
t′(Kiϕ) = t′(ϕ) ∧ Kwit′(ϕ)
This translation t′ is truth preserving (elementary, by induction on ϕ in t′(ϕ)). This demonstrates
that EL  PLKw. As we already had PLKw  EL, by way of translation t defined in the proof of
Proposition 6, we get that EL ≡ PLKw on T .
This result applies to any model class contained in T , such as S4 and S5.
We close this section on expressivity with a curious observation related to (although not strictly
about) expressivity. We now know that knowledge cannot be defined in terms of knowing whether on
K, but that knowledge can be defined in terms of knowing whether on T . It is therefore interesting
to observe that under slightly stronger conditions, knowledge can still be ‘defined’ (in a different
technical sense) in terms of knowing whether on K, namely, given a model, in a world of that model
wherein the agent is ignorant about something. Ignorant means ‘not knowing whether’, so this implies
that knowledge is definable in a world from where there are at least two accessible worlds.
Proposition 9. Assume that M, s  ¬Kwiψ for some ψ. Then: M, s  Ki¬ϕ if and only if there
exists a χ such that M, s  Kwiϕ ∧ Kwi(ϕ→ χ) ∧ ¬Kwiχ.
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Proof. Suppose that M, s  ¬Kwiψ for some ψ. We need to show the equivalence.
First, assume there exists χ: M, s  Kwiϕ ∧ Kwi(ϕ → χ) ∧ ¬Kwiχ. Suppose towards con-
tradiction that M, s 2 Ki¬ϕ, then there exists t such that s →i t and t  ϕ. Moreover, since
M, s  ¬Kwiχ, it follows for some t1, t2 with s →i t1, s →i t2 and t1  χ, t2  ¬χ. By the fact
that s  Kwiϕ, s →i t, s →i t1 and t  ϕ, we get t1  ϕ, similarly we can get t2  ϕ, and thus
t1  ϕ→ χ but t2 2 ϕ→ χ, contradicting the assumption that M, s  Kwi(ϕ→ χ), as desired.
For the converse, assume M, s  Ki¬ϕ. Then for all t such that s →i t : M, t  ¬ϕ, thus
M, t  ϕ → ψ. Therefore M, s  Kwiϕ and M, s  Kwi(ϕ → ψ). It is clear M, s  ¬Kwiψ from
the supposition. Then we can conclude that there exists χ: M, s  Kwiϕ∧Kwi(ϕ→ χ)∧¬Kwiχ.
Intuitively, we can ‘define’ knowledge (the Ki¬ϕ in the proposition) in a given world s, iff there
is some PLKw formula ψ that agent i is ignorant about in s (iff ¬Kwiψ is true in s), in other words,
iff for any proposition whatsoever (ψ) there are two accessible worlds from s with different values for
it.
The property formulated in Prop. 9 is important. It motivates the canonical model construction for
knowing whether logic, as we will see in Section 4.
3.2 Frame correspondence
Standard modal logic formulas can be used to capture frame properties, e.g., Kp → p corresponds
to the reflexivity of frames. It is therefore remarkable that in knowing whether logic there is no such
correspondence for most of the basic frame properties. The authors of [vdHL03] already demonstated
that reflexivity is undefinable in the language of ignorance (which is equally expressive as PLKw, see
Section 7). In this section we extend their result to other frame properties.
Definition 10 (Frame definability). Let Φ be a set of PLKw-formulas and F a class of frames. We say
that Φ defines F if for all frames F , F is in F if and only if F  Φ. In this case we also say Φ defines
the property of F. If Φ is a singleton (e.g. ϕ), we usually write F  ϕ rather than F  {ϕ}. A class of
frames (or the corresponding frame property) is definable in PLKw if there is a set of PLKw-formulas
that defines it.
Proposition 11. Let F be a partial-functional frame and ϕ ∈ PLKw. Then F |= Kwiϕ.
Proof. Given F = 〈S, {→i| i ∈ I}〉, let V be a valuation on F and s ∈ S. Because s has at
most one successor, the semantics of knowing whether gives us that F , V, s |= Kwiϕ. (See also the
countermodels used in the proof of Prop. 6.)
Consequently, we can view Kwiϕ formulas as ⊤ on partial-functional frames. Therefore the only
PLKw validities on partial-functional frames are essentially instantiations of tautologies which are
the same on partial-functional models. A moment of reflection should confirm:
Corollary 12. For any partial-functional frames F ,F ′ and any ϕ ∈ PLKw: F |= ϕ iff F ′ |= ϕ.
Proposition 13. The frame properties of seriality, reflexivity, transitivity, symmetry, and Euclidicity
are not definable in PLKw.
Proof. Consider the following frames:
F1 : s1 // t // u F2 : s2

All two frames are partial-functional. So we have that, for any Φ ⊆ PLKw: F1 |= Φ iff F2 |= Φ.
Now observe that:
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• F2 is reflexive but F1 is not reflexive.
• F2 is serial but F1 is not serial.
• F2 is transitive but F1 is not transitive.
• F2 is symmetric but F1 is not symmetric.
• F2 is Euclidean but F1 is not Euclidean.
The argument now goes as follows. Consider the first item, reflexivity: If Φ were to define reflexivity,
then, as F2 is reflexive, we have F2 |= Φ. But as F2 and F1 satisfy the same frame validities, we
also have that F1 |= Φ. However, F1 is not reflexive. Therefore such a Φ does not exist. Therefore,
reflexivity is not frame definable in knowing whether logic.
The argument is similar for the other cases, using the other items in the list above. (Observe that
F1 is indeed not Euclidean, because s1 → t and s1 → t, but it is not the case that t→ t.)
As a consequence of this result, the axiomatizations of knowing whether logics over special frame
classes, such as the class of reflexive frames, cannot be shown by the standard method of adding the
corresponding frame axioms to the axiomatization of PLKw. This will be addressed in Section 5.
4 Axiomatization
In this section we give a complete Hilbert-style proof system for the logic PLKw on the class of all
frames.
4.1 Proof system and soundness
Definition 14 (Proof system PLKW). The proof system PLKW consists of the following axiom
schemas and inference rules.
TAUT all instances of tautologies
KwCon Kwi(χ→ ϕ) ∧ Kwi(¬χ→ ϕ)→ Kwiϕ
KwDis Kwiϕ→ Kwi(ϕ→ ψ) ∨ Kwi(¬ϕ→ χ)
Kw↔ Kwiϕ↔ Kwi¬ϕ
MP From ϕ and ϕ→ ψ infer ψ
NECKw From ϕ infer Kwiϕ
REKw From ϕ↔ ψ infer Kwiϕ↔ Kwiψ
A derivation is a finite sequence of PLKw formulas such that each formula is either the instan-
tiation of an axiom or the result of applying a inference rule to prior formulas in the sequence. A
formula ϕ ∈ PLKw is called derivable, or a theorem, notation ⊢ ϕ, if it occurs in a derivation.
Intuitively, KwCon means if an agent knows whether a formula is implied not only by some
formula but by its negation, then the agent also knows whether the formula holds; KwDis means if
an agent knows whether a formula holds, then either the agent knows this formula holds, in which
case the agent knows whether its negation implies any formula, or the agent knows it does not hold, in
which case the agent knows whether it implies any formula; Kw↔ means knowing whether a formula
holds is same as knowing whether the formula does not hold.
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Proposition 15. The proof system PLKW is sound with respect to the class of all frames.
Proof. The soundness of PLKW follows immediately from the validity of three crucial axioms. The
other axioms and the derivation rules are obviously valid. We prove that:
1. KwCon is valid:  Kwi(χ→ ϕ) ∧ Kwi(¬χ→ ϕ)→ Kwiϕ
2. KwDis is valid:  Kwiϕ→ Kwi(ϕ→ ψ) ∨ Kwi(¬ϕ→ χ)
3. Kw↔ is valid:  Kwiϕ↔ Kwi¬ϕ
Proof:
1. Assume towards a contradiction that for some (M, s) such that M, s  Kwi(χ → ϕ), M, s 
Kwi(¬χ → ϕ) but M, s  ¬Kwiϕ, then there exist t1, t2 such that s →i t1, s →i t2 and
t1  ϕ, t2  ¬ϕ. Clearly, with t1  ϕ we get t1  χ → ϕ and t1  ¬χ → ϕ. Thus from the
fact that s  Kwi(χ→ ϕ), s→i t1, s→i t2 and t1  χ→ ϕ we get t2  χ→ ϕ. Similarly, by
using t1  ¬χ→ ϕ we can get t2  ¬χ→ ϕ. Now we obtain t2  χ→ ϕ and t2  ¬χ→ ϕ,
therefore t2  ϕ. Contradiction.
2. Let (M, s) be an arbitrary model. Suppose via contraposition that M, s  ¬Kwi(ϕ → ψ)
and M, s  ¬Kwi(¬ϕ → χ), we only need to show M, s  ¬Kwiϕ. By supposition, there
exist t1, t2 such that s →i t1, s →i t2 and t1  ϕ → ψ, t2  ¬(ϕ → ψ) and, there exist
u1, u2 such that s →i u1, s →i u2 and u1  ¬ϕ → χ, u2  ¬(¬ϕ → χ), respectively. From
t2  ¬(ϕ → ψ) and u2  ¬(¬ϕ → χ) it follows t2  ϕ and u2  ¬ϕ respectively. So far we
have shown s→i t2, s→i u2 and t2  ϕ, u2  ¬ϕ, therefore we conclude thatM, s  ¬Kwiϕ,
as desired.
3. This is immediate from the semantics of Kwi.
Proposition 16. Consider the inference rule Substitution of equivalents:
Sub From ϕ↔ ψ, infer χ[ϕ/p]↔ χ[ψ/p]
Substitution of equivalents is admissible in PLKW.
Proof. By induction on the structure of χ. The non-trivial case is Kwiχ. Suppose ⊢ ϕ ↔ ψ. By
inductive hypothesis we have ⊢ χ[ϕ/p] ↔ χ[ψ/p]. Then, using REKw, we get ⊢ Kwi(χ[ϕ/p]) ↔
Kwi(χ[ψ/p]), i.e. ⊢ Kwiχ[ϕ/p]↔ Kwiχ[ψ/p].
The inference rule REKw in the system PLKW is crucial. Consider again the schema
K Kwi(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Kwiϕ→ Kwiψ)
We have already shown in Section 2 that K is invalid. This axiom is typically used to prove Sub, but
is lacking in PLKW. Without REKw (see the proof above) Sub is not admissable in PLKW.
We will now first derive a PLKW theorem (Proposition 19) that will play an important part in the
completeness proof. To structure the derivation we employ two lemmas deriving PLKW theorems.
Lemma 17. ⊢ ( Kwiχ ∧ Kwi(¬χ→ ϕ) ∧ ¬Kwiϕ ∧ Kwi(χ→ ψ) )→ Kwiψ
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Proof.
(i) Kwi(¬χ→ ϕ) ∧ ¬Kwiϕ→ ¬Kwi(χ→ ϕ) KwCon,TAUT
(ii) Kwiχ→ Kwi(χ→ ϕ) ∨ Kwi(¬χ→ ψ) KwDis
(iii) Kwi(χ→ ψ) ∧ Kwi(¬χ→ ψ)→ Kwiψ KwCon
(iv) (Kwiχ ∧ Kwi(¬χ→ ϕ) ∧ ¬Kwiϕ)→ Kwi(¬χ→ ψ) TAUT, (i), (ii)
(v) (Kwiχ ∧ Kwi(¬χ→ ϕ) ∧ ¬Kwiϕ ∧ Kwi(χ→ ψ))→ Kwiψ TAUT, (iii), (iv)
Lemma 18.
⊢ ( Kwi(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ → χ) ∧ Kwiψ ∧ Kwi(ψ → δ) ∧ ¬Kwiδ )→ Kwi(ϕ→ χ)
Proof.
(i) (Kwiψ ∧ Kwi(¬ψ → (ϕ→ χ)) ∧ ¬Kwi(ϕ→ χ) ∧ Kwi(ψ → δ))→ Kwiδ Lemma 17
(ii) (Kwi(¬ψ → (ϕ→ χ)) ∧ Kwiψ ∧ Kwi(ψ → δ) ∧ ¬Kwiδ)→ Kwi(ϕ→ χ) TAUT, (i)
(iii) (ϕ ∧ ¬ψ → χ)↔ (¬ψ → (ϕ→ χ)) TAUT
(iv) Kwi(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ → χ)↔ Kwi(¬ψ → (ϕ→ χ)) REKw, (iii)
(v) (Kwi(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ → χ) ∧ Kwiψ ∧ Kwi(ψ → δ) ∧ ¬Kwiδ)→ Kwi(ϕ→ χ) Sub, (ii), (iv)
Proposition 19. For all k ≥ 1:
⊢


k∧
j=1
Kwiχj ∧ Kwi(
k∧
j=1
¬χj → ϕ) ∧ ¬Kwiϕ ∧
k∧
j=1
Kwi(χj → ψj)

→
k∨
j=1
Kwiψj
Proof. The proof is by induction on k. The base step k = 1 is clear from Lemma 17. For the inductive
step, assume by inductive hypothesis (IH) that the proposition holds for k = m. We now show that:
⊢


m+1∧
j=1
Kwiχj ∧ Kwi(
m+1∧
j=1
¬χj → ϕ) ∧ ¬Kwiϕ ∧
m+1∧
j=1
Kwi(χj → ψj)

→
m+1∨
j=1
Kwiψj
The proof is as follows.
1 (
∧m
j=1 Kwiχj ∧ Kwi(
∧m
j=1 ¬χj → ϕ) ∧ ¬Kwiϕ
∧
∧m
j=1 Kwi(χj → ψj))→
∨m
j=1 Kwiψj IH
2 (Kwi(
∧m
j=1 ¬χj ∧ ¬χm+1 → ϕ) ∧ Kwiχm+1 ∧ Kwi(χm+1 → ψm+1)
∧¬Kwiψm+1)→ Kwi(
∧m
j=1 ¬χj → ϕ) Lemma 18
3 (Kwi(
∧m+1
j=1 ¬χj → ϕ) ∧ Kwiχm+1 ∧ Kwi(χm+1 → ψm+1)
∧¬Kwiψm+1)→ Kwi(
∧m
j=1 ¬χj → ϕ) REKw, 2
4 (Kwi(
∧m+1
j=1 ¬χj → ϕ) ∧
∧m+1
j=1 Kwiχj ∧
∧m+1
j=1 Kwi(χj → ψj)
∧¬Kwiψm+1 ∧ ¬Kwiϕ)→ (
∧m
j=1 Kwiχj ∧ Kwi(
∧m
j=1 ¬χj → ϕ)
∧¬Kwiϕ ∧
∧m
j=1 Kwi(χj → ψj)) 3
5 (Kwi(
∧m+1
j=1 ¬χj → ϕ) ∧
∧m+1
j=1 Kwiχj
∧
∧m+1
j=1 Kwi(χj → ψj) ∧ ¬Kwiψm+1 ∧ ¬Kwiϕ)→
∨m
j=1 Kwiψj 1, 4
6 (
∧m+1
j=1 Kwiχj ∧ Kwi(
∧m+1
j=1 ¬χj → ϕ) ∧ ¬Kwiϕ
∧
∧m+1
j=1 Kwi(χj → ψj))→
∨m+1
j=1 Kwiψj 5
9
4.2 Completeness
We proceed with the completeness of the proof system PLKW. The completeness of the logic is
shown via a canonical model construction.
Definition 20 (Canonical model). The canonical model Mc of PLKW is the tuple 〈Sc, {→ci | i ∈
I}, V c〉, where:
• Sc = {s | s is a maximal consistent set of PLKW}.
• s→ci t iff
1. there exists χ such that ¬Kwiχ ∈ s and
2. for all ϕ and ψ: Kwiϕ ∧ Kwi(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ¬Kwiψ ∈ s implies ¬ϕ ∈ t.
• V c(p) = {s ∈ Sc | p ∈ s}.
We observe that every consistent set of PLKW can be extended to a maximal consistent set of
PLKW (Lindenbaum Lemma) in the standard way. The binary relations between worlds in the canon-
ical model are special. The definition is inspired by the canonical relation where s →ci t iff for all ϕ:
Kiϕ ∈ s implies ϕ ∈ t, and the observation of Proposition 9, the ‘almost definability’ of knowledge.
We also use the contrapositive this condition:
For every i ∈ I, s→ci t iff (1.) there exists χ such that ¬Kwiχ ∈ s and (2.) for all ϕ and
ψ: if ϕ ∈ t then at least one of Kwiϕ, Kwi(ϕ→ ψ) and ¬Kwiψ is not in s.
Lemma 21 (Truth Lemma). For any PLKw formula ϕ, Mc, s  ϕ iff ϕ ∈ s.
Proof. By induction on ϕ. The only non-trivial case is Kwiϕ.
“⇐”: Assume towards contradiction that Kwiϕ ∈ s but M, s  ¬Kwiϕ, namely there are t1 and
t2 such that s→ci t1 and s→ci t2 and Mc, t1  ϕ and Mc, t2  ¬ϕ. From Mc, t1  ϕ and Mc, t2 
¬ϕ, and the induction hypothesis, we infer that ϕ ∈ t1 and ¬ϕ ∈ t2, respectively. From s →ci t1
and (1.) we infer that there is a χ1 such that ¬Kwiχ1 ∈ s. From that, the assumption Kwiϕ ∈ s and
(2.) follows that Kwi(ϕ → χ1) 6∈ s, i.e., ¬Kwi(ϕ → χ1) ∈ s. Similarly, from s →ci t2 we derive
that there is a χ2 such that ¬Kwi(¬ϕ → χ2) ∈ s. From ¬Kwi(ϕ → χ1),¬Kwi(¬ϕ → χ2) ∈ s and
Axiom KwDis we now have ¬Kwiϕ ∈ s. Contradiction.
“⇒”: Assume that Kwiϕ /∈ s. To show that s 2 Kwiϕ, we need to construct two points t1, t2 ∈ Sc
such that s→ci t1, s→ci t2 and ϕ ∈ t1,¬ϕ ∈ t2. First we have to show:
1. {¬χ | Kwiχ ∧ Kwi(χ→ ψ) ∧ ¬Kwiψ ∈ s for some ψ} ∪ {¬ϕ} is consistent.
2. {¬χ | Kwiχ ∧ Kwi(χ→ ψ′) ∧ ¬Kwiψ′ ∈ s for some ψ′} ∪ {ϕ} is consistent.
We prove item 1. Suppose the set is inconsistent. Then there exist χ1, · · · , χn and ψ1, · · · , ψn
such that ⊢ ¬χ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬χn → ϕ and Kwiχk ∧ Kwi(χk → ψk) ∧ ¬Kwiψk ∈ s for all k ∈ [1, n].
From NECKw, we have Kwi((
∧n
k=1 ¬χk) → ϕ) ∈ s. Now since Kwiϕ /∈ s, from the maximal
consistency of s we get ¬Kwiϕ ∈ s. Then, from Proposition 19 we infer that
∨n
k=1 Kwiψk ∈ s. And
this contradicts that ¬Kwiψk ∈ s for all k ∈ [1, n].
From item 1, the definition of the canonical relation, and the observation that every consistent set
has a maximal consistent extension (Lindenbaum Lemma), we conclude that there exists a t2 ∈ Sc
such that s→ci t2 and ¬ϕ ∈ t2.
The proof of item 2 is similar to item 1, but we need to use Kw↔, and similarly, from item 2 we
derive that there exists a t1 ∈ Sc such that s→ci t1 and ϕ ∈ t1.
10
Theorem 22 (Completeness). PLKW is complete with respect to the class K of all frames. That is,
for every ϕ ∈ PLKw,  ϕ implies ⊢ ϕ.
Proof. Suppose 0 ϕ, then ¬ϕ is PLKW-consistent. By Lindenbaum-Lemma there exists s ∈ Sc such
that ¬ϕ ∈ s, and thus Mc, s  ¬ϕ by Truth Lemma, therefore 2 ϕ.
Given the translation from PLKw to EL (i.e. the translation t in the proof of Proposition 6), and
the decidability of EL, the (satisfiability problem of) knowing whether logic is obviously decidable.
Proposition 23 (Decidability of PLKw). The logic PLKw is decidable.
5 Axiomatization: extensions
In this section we will give extensions of PLKW w.r.t. various classes of frames, and prove their
completeness. Definition 24 shows the extra axiom schemas and corresponding systems, with on the
right-hand side in the table the frame classes for which we will demonstrate completeness.
Definition 24 (Extensions of PLKW).
Notation Axiom Schemas Systems Frames
KwT Kwiϕ ∧ Kwi(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ϕ→ Kwiψ PLKWT = PLKW+ KwT T
Kw4 Kwiϕ→ Kwi(Kwiϕ ∨ ψ) PLKW4 = PLKW+ Kw4 4
Kw5 ¬Kwiϕ→ Kwi(¬Kwiϕ ∨ ψ) PLKW5 = PLKW+ Kw5 5
wKw4 Kwiϕ→ KwiKwiϕ PLKWS4 = PLKW+ KwT+ wKw4 S4
wKw5 ¬Kwiϕ→ Kwi¬Kwiϕ PLKWS5 = PLKW+ KwT+ wKw5 S5
Proposition 25.
• KwT is valid on the class of all T -frames;
• Kw4 is valid on the class of all 4-frames;
• Kw5 is valid on the class of all 5-frames.
Proof.
• Given any M = 〈S, {→i| i ∈ I}, V 〉 based on a reflexive frame and an s ∈ S, suppose
M, s  Kwiϕ ∧ Kwi(ϕ → ψ) ∧ ϕ. Towards a contradiction assume M, s 2 Kwiψ, then there
exist t, t′ such that s →i t, s →i t′ and t  ψ, t′  ¬ψ. From the reflexivity of s it follows that
s →i s, and thus t  ϕ, t′  ϕ by the facts that s  Kwiϕ ∧ ϕ, s →i t, s →i t′. Then it is easy
to get t  ϕ→ ψ but t′ 2 ϕ→ ψ, which contradicts the supposition s  Kwi(ϕ→ ψ).
• Given any M = 〈S, {→i| i ∈ I}, V 〉 based on a transitive frame and an s ∈ S, suppose that
M, s  Kwiϕ. Towards a contradiction assume M, s 2 Kwi(Kwiϕ∨ψ) for some ψ, then there
exist t, t′ such that s →i t, s →i t′ and t  Kwiϕ ∨ ψ, t′  ¬Kwiϕ ∧ ¬ψ. From t′  ¬Kwiϕ it
follows that for some u, u′ such that t′ →i u, t′ →i u′ and u  ϕ, u′  ¬ϕ. From transitivity
it follows that s →i u, s →i u′ due to the facts that s →i t′, t′ →i u and t′ →i u′. Therefore
s 2 Kwiϕ, contradicting the assumption.
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• Given any M = 〈S, {→i| i ∈ I}, V 〉 based on an Euclidean frame and an s ∈ S, suppose that
M, s  ¬Kwiϕ. Towards a contradiction assume M, s 2 Kwi(¬Kwiϕ ∨ ψ). Then there exist
t, t′ such that s →i t, s →i t′ and t  ¬Kwiϕ ∨ ψ, t′  Kwiϕ ∧ ¬ψ. Moreover, it follows that
for some u, u′ such that s →i u, s →i u′ and u  ϕ, u′  ¬ϕ from the supposition. Since M
is Euclidean, t′ →i u and t′ →i u′ based on the facts that s →i t′, s →i u, s →i u′. Therefore
t′ 2 Kwiϕ because u  ϕ, u′  ¬ϕ, contradicting t′  Kwiϕ.
To prove the soundness of the novel proof systems we only need to refer to the soundness of the
axioms KwT, Kw4, and Kw5, as demonstrated in Proposition 25. Before we proceed to demonstrate
the completeness of these systems, let us first give some intuitions and motivation to explain the form
of the axioms. The reader might have expected a more familiar connection between frame classes and
axioms instead:
• For reflexive frames: why not Kwiϕ→ ϕ instead of Kwiϕ ∧ Kwi(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ϕ→ Kwiψ?
• For transitive frames: why not Kwiϕ→ KwiKwiϕ instead of Kwiϕ→ Kwi(Kwiϕ ∨ ψ)?
• For Euclidean frames: why not ¬Kwiϕ→ Kwi¬Kwiϕ instead of ¬Kwiϕ→ Kwi(¬Kwiϕ∨ψ)?
First, we recall the reader that none of these frame classes are definable by knowing whether formulas
(Prop. 13). So, the axioms in the proof systems defined above fulfil a different role, there is no
correspondence in the standard modal logical sense. Second, the three ‘familiar’ formula schemas
tentatively stipulated above could of course still be valid. But are they? Sometimes yes, at other
times no. Concerning Kwiϕ → ϕ: this is of course not valid in knowing whether logic (you may
know whether p because you know that p is false). Further, trying to obtain an interesting validity by
translating axiom Kiϕ → ϕ from epistemic logic into PLKw (according to the translation defined in
Prop. 8) does not lead anywhere: we get ϕ∧Kwiϕ→ ϕ, a tautology. Concerning Kwiϕ→ KwiKwiϕ:
this is valid on transitive frames. It is also derivable in the proof system PLKW4 defined above: it
is essentially an instantiation of axiom Kw4 for ψ = ⊥.2 But just this principle wKw4 on top of
PLKW was not enough to obtain completeness (Prop. 27 below), we do need the stronger version
Kw4. However, in the presence of KwT, wKw4 is sufficient to demonstrate completeness for PLKWS4
(Prop. 35), since we can actually derive Kw4 in the system based on wKw4 and KwT (Prop. 26). A
similar story goes for wKw5 and Kw5: PLKW+wKw5 is not complete w.r.t. Euclidean frames but
PLKWS5 = PLKW+ KwT+ wKw5 is complete w.r.t. S5-frames (Prop. 28 and Prop. 36).
The following proposition says that Kw4 and Kw5 are derivable in PLKWS4 and PLKWS5 re-
spectively, which are crucial in the proofs of Theorem 35 and Theorem 36, respectively.
Proposition 26. 1. ⊢PLKWS4 Kwiϕ→ Kwi(Kwiϕ ∨ ψ)
2. ⊢PLKWS5 ¬Kwiϕ→ Kwi(¬Kwiϕ ∨ ψ)
2Note that Kwiϕ ∨ ⊥ is equivalent to Kwiϕ and we can apply the substitution of equivalents principle Sub (this is
admissable as well in all defined extensions of PLKW).
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Proof. 1. The following is a derivation in PLKWS4:
(i) Kwiϕ→ (Kwiϕ ∨ ψ) TAUT
(ii) Kwi(Kwiϕ→ (Kwiϕ ∨ ψ)) NECKw, (i)
(iii) KwiKwiϕ ∧ Kwi(Kwiϕ→ (Kwiϕ ∨ ψ)) ∧ Kwiϕ→ Kwi(Kwiϕ ∨ ψ) KwT
(iv) KwiKwiϕ ∧ Kwiϕ→ Kwi(Kwiϕ ∨ ψ) (ii), (iii)
(v) Kwiϕ→ KwiKwiϕ wKw4
(vi) Kwiϕ→ Kwi(Kwiϕ ∨ ψ) (iv), (v)
2. Similar to 1, by using Axiom wKw5.
Before the completeness results, we first show two negative results which demonstrate that only
adding wKw4 (resp. wKw5) on top of PLKW is not enough for completeness of PLKw over transitive
(resp. Euclidean) frames.
Proposition 27. PLKW+ wKw4 is incomplete with respect to the class of transitive frames.
Proof. Recall that Kwip → Kwi(Kwip ∨ q) is an instance of Kw4 and it is valid on the class of all
transitive frames (Prop.25). We will show that this formula is not a theorem of PLKW+ wKw4. For
this, we construct a model M such that PLKW+ wKw4 is sound with respect to validity on M (i.e.
for any PLKw formula ϕ, ⊢PLKW+wKw4 ϕ implies M  ϕ), but M 2 Kwip → Kwi(Kwip ∨ q).
Therefore 0PLKW+wKw4 Kwip → Kwi(Kwip ∨ q). Since Kwip → Kwi(Kwip ∨ q) is not provable in
PLKW+ wKw4 but it is valid over transitive frames, PLKW+ wKw4 is not complete w.r.t. the class
of all transitive frames.
Consider the following model M (w.l.o.g. let us assume P = {p, q}):
u1 : p, q t1 : p, q
u : p,¬q
gg◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆
ww♣♣♣
♣♣
♣♣
♣♣
♣♣
♣
t : p, q
88qqqqqqqqqq
&&▼
▼▼
▼▼
▼▼
▼▼
▼
u2 : ¬p,¬q s : p, q
99tttttttttt
ee▲▲▲▲▲▲▲▲▲▲
t2 : ¬p,¬q
First, remember that all the axioms of PLKW are valid on the class of all frames (Prop.15), thus
they are also valid on M. As for the inference rules, their validities on M do not follow immediately
from the fact that these rules are valid on the class of all frames. However, it is not hard to check that
MP,NECKw and REKw are indeed valid on M, i.e., if the premise is valid on M then the conclusion
is also valid on M.
Second, wKw4 is valid on M: by the construction of M, it is not hard to show by induction on
the structure of ϕ ∈ PLKw that: for any ϕ, t1  ϕ iff u1  ϕ, and t2  ϕ iff u2  ϕ (∗). As
none of worlds t1, t2, u1, u2 has any successor, then all of them satisfy KwiKwiϕ, thus also satisfy
wKw4 (Kwiϕ → KwiKwiϕ). Also, since t1 and t2 both satisfy Kwiϕ for any ϕ, t  KwiKwiϕ for
any ϕ too, and thus t  Kwiϕ → KwiKwiϕ. Similarly, we can show that u  Kwiϕ → KwiKwiϕ
for any ϕ. Now from (∗) we can see t  Kwiϕ iff u  Kwiϕ, which implies s  KwiKwiϕ, and thus
s  Kwiϕ→ KwiKwiϕ. In sum, wKw4 is valid on M.
Finally, it is clear that M, s 2 Kwip→ Kwi(Kwip∨q), thus M 2 Kwip→ Kwi(Kwip∨q). Since
PLKW+ wKw4 is sound w.r.t. M then we have 0PLKW+wKw4 Kwip→ Kwi(Kwip ∨ q).
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Proposition 28. PLKW+ wKw5 is incomplete with respect to the class of Euclidean frames.
Proof. The strategy is similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 27. Recall that the formula ¬Kwip→
Kwi(¬Kwip ∨ q) is valid on the class of all Euclidean frames (Prop. 25). We only need to show
that this formula is not a theorem of PLKW + wKw5. For this, we construct a model N such that
PLKW+wKw5 is sound with respect to N (i.e., all the theorems of PLKW+wKw5 are valid on N ),
but N 2 ¬Kwip→ Kwi(¬Kwip ∨ q).
Consider the following model N (again, let us assume P = {p, q}):
t : p, q
s : p, q
88qqqqqqqqqqq
&&◆◆
◆◆
◆◆
◆◆
◆◆
◆
u : ¬p,¬q
As in the previous proof, the axioms and inference rules of PLKW are valid on N .
Now we show wKw5 is valid on N : by the construction of N , neither t nor u has successor, then
they both satisfy Kwi¬Kwiϕ, and thus satisfy wKw5 (¬Kwiϕ → Kwi¬Kwiϕ). Also, t  Kwiϕ and
u  Kwiϕ, then s  Kwi¬Kwiϕ, and thus s  ¬Kwiϕ→ Kwi¬Kwiϕ.
It is clear that N , s 2 ¬Kwip→ Kwi(¬Kwip ∨ q), thus N 2 ¬Kwip→ Kwi(¬Kwip ∨ q).
We now continue with the completeness proofs for the extended proof systems. We first address
the completeness of PLKWT. In the canonical model construction of Def. 20 it is unclear whether the
canonical relation is reflexive. To ensure that the relations are reflexive, we take the reflexive closure
of the canonical relation.
Definition 29 (Canonical model of PLKWT). The canonical model Mc of PLKWT is the same as
Mc in Def. 20, except that Sc consists of all maximal consistent sets of PLKWT, and that →ci is the
reflexive closure of the canonical relation defined in Def. 20.
As before, we use an equivalent definition of the canonical relation: s →ci t iff s = t or (there
exists a χ such that ¬Kwiχ ∈ s, and for all ϕ and ψ: ϕ ∈ t implies that at least one of Kwiϕ,
Kwi(ϕ→ ψ) and ¬Kwiψ is not in s).
Lemma 30 (Truth Lemma for PLKWT). For any PLKw formula ϕ, Mc, s  ϕ iff ϕ ∈ s.
Proof. By induction on ϕ. We consider the non-trivial case for Kwiϕ.
Left-to-right: This is similar to the corresponding proof in Lemma 21. Observe that all pairs in
the canonical relation in Def. 20 are also in the relation →ci from Def. 29.
Right-to-left: Assume towards contradiction that Kwiϕ ∈ s but Mc, s  ¬Kwiϕ, namely there
are distinct states t1 and t2 such that s →ci t1 and s →ci t2 and M, t1  ϕ and M, t2  ¬ϕ. By
induction hypothesis, ϕ ∈ t1 and ¬ϕ ∈ t2. As →ci is reflexive, we need to consider two cases (s = t1
and s = t2 is impossible, because t1 6= t2):
• s 6= t1 and s 6= t2.
Then the proof is same as the corresponding one in Lemma 21. And finally we can get a
contradiction.
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• s = t1 or s = t2.
We may as well consider the case s = t1 and s 6= t2. Since ¬ϕ ∈ t2, Kwiϕ ∈ s, and s→ci t2, by
the equivalent definition of →c, there exists χ such that ¬Kwiχ ∈ s and ¬Kwi(¬ϕ → χ) ∈ s.
By ϕ ∈ s and Kwiϕ ∈ s and Axiom KwT, we get Kwi(ϕ → χ) → Kwiχ ∈ s. Since
¬Kwiχ ∈ s, ¬Kwi(ϕ → χ) ∈ s. Now ¬Kwi(¬ϕ → χ) ∈ s and ¬Kwi(ϕ → χ) ∈ s, thus by
Axiom KwDis we conclude that ¬Kwiϕ ∈ s. Contradiction.
Based on the above lemma, it is routine to show the following.
Theorem 31. PLKWT is complete with respect to the class of all T -frames.
Now let us look at the completeness for PLKW4 and PLKW5. In these cases we do not need to
revise the canonical relations.
Theorem 32. PLKW4 is complete with respect to the class of all 4-frames.
Proof. Define Mc as in Def. 20 w.r.t. PLKW4. We only need to show that →ci is transitive.
Given s, t, u ∈ Sc. Assume that s →ci t and t →ci u. From s →ci t it follows that there exist χ
such that ¬Kwiχ ∈ s. To show s →ci u, by the definition of the canonical relation, we need to prove
that for all ϕ and ψ: Kwiϕ ∧ Kwi(ϕ → ψ) ∧ ¬Kwiψ ∈ s implies ¬ϕ ∈ u. From now on, let us fix
two formulas ϕ and ψ such that Kwiϕ ∧ Kwi(ϕ → ψ) ∧ ¬Kwiψ ∈ s. We need to show ¬ϕ ∈ u.
From t →ci u it follows that there is a χ′ such that ¬Kwiχ′ ∈ t. Now according to the definition of
→ci again, if we can show that Kwiϕ ∧ Kwi(ϕ→ χ′) ∈ t, then by t→ci u, we have ¬ϕ ∈ u.
We first show that Kwiϕ ∈ t: As Kwiϕ ∈ s, first, by wKw4 and Kw↔ we get Kwi¬Kwiϕ ∈ s;
second, by Axiom Kw4 we get Kwi(Kwiϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ s, i.e. Kwi(¬Kwiϕ → ψ) ∈ s. Now we obtain
Kwi¬Kwiϕ ∈ s, Kwi(¬Kwiϕ→ ψ) ∈ s, and ¬Kwiψ ∈ s. By s→ci t we have Kwiϕ ∈ t.
We now show that Kwi(ϕ → χ′) ∈ t: Since Kwi(ϕ → ψ) ∧ ¬Kwiψ ∈ s, it follows from Axiom
KwCon that ¬Kwi(¬ϕ → ψ) ∈ s. Since Kwiϕ ∈ s, Kwi(ϕ → χ′) ∨ Kwi(¬ϕ → ψ) ∈ s by
KwDis, thus Kwi(ϕ → χ′) ∈ s. Using wKw4 and Kw↔, we get Kwi¬Kwi(ϕ → χ′) ∈ s; with
Axiom Kw4, we get Kwi(Kwi(ϕ → χ′) ∨ ψ) ∈ s, i.e. Kwi(¬Kwi(ϕ → χ′) → ψ) ∈ s. Now
Kwi¬Kwi(ϕ → χ′) ∧ Kwi(¬Kwi(ϕ → χ′) → ψ) ∧ ¬Kwiψ ∈ s. From s →ci t we conclude that
Kwi(ϕ→ χ′) ∈ t, as desired.
Theorem 33. PLKW5 is complete with respect to the class of all 5-frames.
Proof. Define Mc as in Def. 20 w.r.t. PLKW5. We only need to show that →ci is Euclidean. Let
s, t, u ∈ Sc be given, and assume s →ci t and s →ci u. We then need to show that t →ci u, that is to
say:
• There exists a χ such that ¬Kwiχ ∈ t (†)
• For all ϕ and ψ: Kwiϕ ∧ Kwi(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ¬Kwiψ ∈ t implies ¬ϕ ∈ u. (‡)
(†): from the assumption s →ci t it follows that there exists χ1 such that ¬Kwiχ1 ∈ s. In the
following we prove ¬Kwiχ1 ∈ t. Using s →ci t again, if we can show KwiKwiχ1 ∧ Kwi(Kwiχ1 →
χ1) ∧ ¬Kwiχ1 ∈ s then we are done. By ¬Kwiχ1 ∈ s, wKw5 and Kw↔, we have KwiKwiχ1 ∈ s.
Using ¬Kwiχ1 ∈ s again and ⊢ ¬Kwiχ1 → Kwi(¬Kwiχ1 ∨ χ1) (an instance of Axiom Kw5),
we get Kwi(¬Kwiχ1 ∨ χ1) ∈ s, and thus Kwi(Kwiχ1 → χ1) ∈ s from TAUT and REKw. Hence
KwiKwiχ1 ∧ Kwi(Kwiχ1 → χ1) ∧ ¬Kwiχ1 ∈ s, and therefore ¬Kwiχ1 ∈ t by s→ci t.
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(‡): Now fixing two formulas ϕ,ψ such that Kwiϕ∧Kwi(ϕ→ ψ)∧¬Kwiψ ∈ t, we need to show
¬ϕ ∈ u. By the similar strategy as in the proof of Thm. 32, if we can prove Kwiϕ∧Kwi(ϕ→ χ1) ∈ s,
then by ¬Kwiχ1 ∈ s and s→ci u, we get ¬ϕ ∈ u.
We first show Kwiϕ ∈ s: if not, i.e. ¬Kwiϕ ∈ s, then first, by wKw5 and Kw↔we get KwiKwiϕ ∈
s; second, by Axiom Kw5 we get Kwi(¬Kwiϕ ∨ χ1) ∈ s, i.e. Kwi(Kwiϕ→ χ1) ∈ s. Remember that
¬Kwiχ1 ∈ s, thus we have shown KwiKwiϕ ∧ Kwi(Kwiϕ → χ1) ∧ ¬Kwiχ1 ∈ s. Then, by s →ci t
we get ¬Kwiϕ ∈ t, a contradiction.
We now show Kwi(ϕ → χ1) ∈ s: if not, i.e. ¬Kwi(ϕ → χ1) ∈ s, then first, by wKw5 and Kw↔
we get KwiKwi(ϕ → χ1) ∈ s; second, by Axiom Kw5 we get Kwi(¬Kwi(ϕ → χ1) ∨ χ1) ∈ s, i.e.
Kwi(Kwi(ϕ→ χ1)→ χ1) ∈ s. Now KwiKwi(ϕ→ χ1)∧Kwi(Kwi(ϕ→ χ1)→ χ1)∧¬Kwiχ1 ∈ s,
then by s→ci t we get ¬Kwi(ϕ→ χ1) ∈ t. Moreover, by supposition Kwi(ϕ→ ψ)∧¬Kwiψ ∈ t and
Axiom KwCon we derive ¬Kwi(¬ϕ → ψ) ∈ t. Then from ¬Kwi(ϕ → χ1) ∧ ¬Kwi(¬ϕ → ψ) ∈ t
and Axiom KwDis it follows that ¬Kwiϕ ∈ t, contradiction.
Corollary 34. PLKW45 is complete with respect to the class of all 45-frames.
Proof. This follows directly from Thm. 32 and Thm. 33. The canonical model w.r.t. PLKW45 is
both transitive and Euclidean.
Theorem 35. PLKWS4 is complete with respect to the class of all S4-frames.
Proof. Define Mc as Def. 29 w.r.t. PLKWS4. Given Thm. 31, we only need to show that →ci is
transitive. Now given s, t, u ∈ Sc, and assume s→ci t and t→ci u, we need to show s→ci u. If s = t
or t = u or s = u, then by the assumption and the fact that →ci is reflexive, we get s→ci u. Thus we
consider the case s 6= t, t 6= u and s 6= u. The proof for this case is the same as Thm. 32, as we can
use Kw4 due to Prop. 26.
Theorem 36. PLKWS5 is complete with respect to the class of all S5-frames.
Proof. Define Mc as Def. 29 w.r.t. PLKWS5. Given Thm. 31, we only need to show that →ci is
Euclidean. Now given s, t, u ∈ Sc, and assume s →ci t and s →ci u, we need to show t →ci u. If
s 6= t, t 6= u and s 6= u, then the proof is the same as in Thm. 33, as we can use Kw5 due to Prop.
26. If s = t or t = u, then by the assumption and the fact that →ci is reflexive, we get t →ci u. If
s = u and t 6= u, we need to show t →ci u. This can be proved by using Axiom KwT instead of the
assumption that s→ci u in the corresponding proof of Thm. 33.
6 Knowing whether logic with announcements
In the muddy children puzzle, children learn their status by repeating the announcement “nobody
knows whether he or she is muddy.” In this section we add public announcement modalities to know-
ing whether logic. We will first give the language and its semantics, and then propose an axiomat-
ization that can be shown to be complete because all formulas with announcements are provably
equivalent to formulas without announcement (the proof system defines a rewrite procedure).
Definition 37 (Language PLKwA). The language of PLKwA is obtained by adding an inductive
clause [ϕ]ϕ to the construction of the language PLKw (see Def. 1).
The formula [ϕ]ψ says that “after public announcement of ϕ, ψ holds.”
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Definition 38. Let M = 〈S, {→′i| i ∈ I}, V 〉 be a model and ϕ,ψ ∈ PLKwA. The semantics of
public announcement is as follows.
M, s  [ϕ]ψ ⇔ M, s  ϕ implies M|ϕ, s  ψ
where M|ϕ = 〈S′, {→′i| i ∈ I}, V ′〉 is such that S′ = {s ∈ S | M, s  ϕ}, →′i = →i ∩ (S′ × S′),
and V ′(p) = V (p) ∩ S′.
Unlike PLKw, the logic PLKwA is not closed under uniform substitution. For instance, p→ [q]p
is valid, but ¬Kwiq → [q]¬Kwiq is not valid, as demonstrated by the following example, wherein
M, s 6|= ¬Kwiq → [q]¬Kwiq.
q
M : s : q
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=⇒!q M
′ : s : q // q
¬q
This is the reason that the proof system below must contain formula variables (schematic formulas)
instead of propositional variables, and also for that reason we have presented the proof system PLKW
in the same way.
Definition 39 (Proof system PLKWA). The proof system PLKWA is the extension of PLKW (Def. 14)
with the following reduction axioms for announcements.
!ATOM [ϕ]p↔ (ϕ→ p)
!NEG [ϕ]¬ψ ↔ (ϕ→ ¬[ϕ]ψ)
!COM [ϕ](ψ ∧ χ)↔ ([ϕ]ψ ∧ [ϕ]χ)
!! [ϕ][ψ]χ↔ [ϕ ∧ [ϕ]ψ]χ
!Kw [ϕ]Kwiψ ↔ (ϕ→ (Kwi[ϕ]ψ ∨ Kwi[ϕ]¬ψ))
Proposition 40 (Soundness). PLKWA is sound with respect to the class of all frames.
Proof. We only consider the non-trivial axiom schema !Kw.
Left-to-right: Given any model M = 〈S, {→i| i ∈ I}, V 〉 based on a frame and s ∈ S, assume
that M, s  [ϕ]Kwiψ. We now need to show that M, s  ϕ → (Kwi[ϕ]ψ ∨ Kwi[ϕ]¬ψ). For this,
suppose M, s  ϕ, to show M, s  Kwi[ϕ]ψ ∨ Kwi[ϕ]¬ψ. By reductio ad absurdum we suppose
M, s 2 Kwi[ϕ]ψ ∨ Kwi[ϕ]¬ψ. Then M, s 2 Kwi[ϕ]ψ and M, s 2 Kwi[ϕ]¬ψ. That is to say, there
exist t, t′ ∈ S such that s →i t, s →i t′ and t  [ϕ]ψ, t′  ¬[ϕ]ψ and, there exist u, u′ ∈ S such
that s →i u, s →i u′ and u  [ϕ]¬ψ, u′  ¬[ϕ]¬ψ. It follows that M, t′  ϕ and M|ϕ, t′  ¬ψ
from t′  ¬[ϕ]ψ, and M, u′  ϕ and M|ϕ, u′  ψ from u′  ¬[ϕ]¬ψ, where M|ϕ is defined as
Definition 38. Moreover, we have s→′i t′, s→′i u′ in M|ϕ because M, s  ϕ,M, t′  ϕ,M, u′  ϕ
and s →i t′, s →i u′. Then M|ϕ, s 2 Kwiψ, contradicting the assumption M, s  [ϕ]Kwiψ and
M, s  ϕ.
Right-to-left: Assume M, s  ϕ. First consider the case that M, s  Kwi[ϕ]ψ. Then, either for
all t with s →i t we have M, t  [ϕ]ψ or for all t with s →i t we have M, t  ¬[ϕ]ψ. In the first
case, with M, s  ϕ, we get for all t with s→′i t,M|ϕ, t  ψ. In the second case, withM, s  ϕ, we
get for all t with s→′i t, M|ϕ, t  ¬ψ. In either subcase we both get M|ϕ, s  Kwiψ. Now consider
the case that M, s  Kwi[ϕ]¬ψ. Similarly, in this case we can also get M|ϕ, s  Kwiψ. Therefore
we can conclude that M, s  [ϕ]Kwiψ.
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The logic PLKwA is equally expressive as knowing whether logic, as the axiomatization induces
a rewrite procedure. By defining a suitable complexity, we can rewrite every formula in PLKwA as a
logically equivalent formula of PLKw of lower complexity, and thus the completeness for PLKWA
follows from the completenes of PLKW (see [vDvdHK07, WC13] for this reduction technique).
Theorem 41 (Completeness of PLKWA). For every ϕ ∈ PLKwA,  ϕ implies ⊢ ϕ.
As axiomatization PLKWA gives a translation of PLKwA into PLKw, and PLKw is decidable
(Prop. 23), the logic of knowing whether with announcements is also decidable.
Proposition 42. PLKwA is decidable.
We can also consider the logic of knowing whether with announcement on other frame classes,
where our main interest is the class of S5 frames. The expressivity of knowing whether logics for other
frame classes also does not change by adding the announcement operator, as the reduction axioms and
rules still allow every formula to be rewritten to an equivalent expression without announcements (so,
a fortiori, this also holds for theorems of those logics).
Theorem 43. Consider the proof system PLKWAS5 that extends PLKWA with KwT and wKw5.
PLKWAS5 is complete with respect to the class of S5-frames.
7 Comparison with the literature
In [vdHL03, vdHL04], the authors give a complete axiomatization of a logic of ignorance with prim-
itive modal construct Iϕ, for ‘the agent is ignorant about ϕ’. If an agent is ignorant about ϕ, she
does not know whether ϕ, so Iϕ is definable as ¬Kwϕ. Their axiomatization Ig is shown in Def. 44,
wherein we have replaced I by ¬Kw. It is different from ours. Now it is of course a matter of taste
whether one prefers the system PLKW over PLKw (page 7) or the one below, but we tend to find
ours simpler, e.g. with respect to the axioms I3 and I4 below.
Definition 44 (Axiomatization Ig [vdHL03, vdHL04]).
I0 All instances of propositional tautologies
I1 ¬Kwiϕ↔ ¬Kwi¬ϕ
I2 ¬Kwi(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ ¬Kwiϕ ∨ ¬Kwiψ
I3 (Kwiϕ ∧ ¬Kwi(χ1 ∧ ϕ) ∧ Kwi(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ¬Kwi(χ2 ∧ (ϕ→ ψ)))→ Kwiψ ∧ ¬Kwi(χ1 ∧ ψ)
I4 Kwiψ ∧ ¬Kwiχ→ ¬Kwi(χ ∧ ψ) ∨ ¬Kwi(χ ∧ ¬ψ)
RI From ϕ infer Kwiϕ ∧ (¬Kwiχ→ ¬Kwi(χ ∧ ϕ))
MP Modus Ponens
Sub Substitution of equivalents
Since both systems are complete, their axioms and inference rules are derivable in our system
PLKW, and we show precisely how to do it: i.e., we will derive in PLKW axioms I2, I3, and I4,
and the rules RI and Sub. This lengthy exercise is reported in Appendix A. PLKW can also be
derived from Ig due to the completeness of Ig.
Proposition 45. All the axioms of Ig are derivable in PLKW and all the rules of Ig are admissible
in PLKW, and vice versa.
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The proof system Ig is also extended with an axiom G4, which we present in terms of Kw:
¬Kwiχ →
(
Kwiϕ∧¬Kwi(ϕ∧χ) → Kwi(Kwiϕ∧¬Kwi(χ∧ϕ))∧¬Kwi(Kwiϕ∧¬Kwi(ϕ∧χ)∧χ)
)
It is then claimed that Ig + G4 is a complete axiomatization of the logic of ignorance over transitive
frames [vdHL04, Lemma 4.2]. Unfortunately, we think that G4 is invalid, thus the system is not
sound. Consider this countermodel M
t1 : p, q
t : p, q
88qqqqqqqqqq
&&▼
▼▼
▼▼
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▼▼
▼
M : s : p, q
77♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥
((PP
PP
PP
PP
PP
PP
P
..
11 t2 : ¬p, q
u : ¬p, q
and the formula
¬Kwip→ (Kwiq ∧ ¬Kwi(q ∧ p)→ Kwi(Kwiq ∧ ¬Kwi(p ∧ q)) ∧ ¬Kwi(Kwiq ∧ ¬Kwi(q ∧ p) ∧ p))
Observe s  ¬Kwip and s  Kwiq ∧ ¬Kwi(q ∧ p). Then, note that s 6 Kwi(Kwiq ∧ ¬Kwi(p ∧ q))
(take u and t as two witnesses), thus s 6 Kwi(Kwiq∧¬Kwi(p∧ q))∧¬Kwi(Kwiq∧¬Kwi(q∧p)∧p).
Therefore, this formula is false in state s of this model M, which invalidates G4.3
In this paper, we advanced the research beyond [vdHL04] by proving expressivity results and more
undefinability results. And more importantly, apart from correctly axiomatizing knowing whether
logic over transitive frames (the system PLKW4), we also axiomatized PLKw on various other frame
classes, which was considered hard in [vdHL04]. Further, we extended knowing whether logic with
public announcements, and gave a complete axiomatization for that extension.
Another recent work on a logic of ignorance is [Ste08]. The author gives a topological semantics
for the logic of ignorance and completely axiomatizes it by the following proof system LB (we have
replaced  in [Ste08] by Kw):
Definition 46 (Axiomatization LB).
TAUT All instances of propositional tautologies
N Kwi⊤ ↔ ⊤
Z Kwiϕ↔ Kwi¬ϕ
R Kwiϕ ∧ Kwiψ → Kwi(ϕ ∧ ψ)
WM From Kwiϕ ∧ ϕ→ ψ infer Kwiϕ ∧ ϕ→ Kwiψ ∧ ψ
MP Modus Ponens
Sub Substitution of equivalents
This proof system is equivalent to our system PLKWS4 for PLKw over S4-frames in the follow-
ing sense.
3Confirmed by the authors of [vdHL04] by personal communication.
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Proposition 47. All the axioms of LB are derivable in PLKWS4 and all the rules of LB are admiss-
ible in PLKWS4, and vise versa.
Appendix B contains the proof. Unlike Proposition 45, Proposition 47 cannot be obtained using
the completeness of both systems, since the semantics of the two logics are different. Compared
to PLKWS4, the axioms of LB are simpler, while the rules are more complicated (WM is clearly a
complex derivation rule, and in PLKWS4 the rule Sub is admissable instead). It is again a matter
of taste which system is preferable. Nevertheless, the above result also shows that the topological
semantics in [Ste08] is equivalent to our Kripke semantics over S4-frames, modulo validity.
8 Conclusions and further research
We first summarize our contributions.
• We gave complete axiomatizations of PLKw over the frame classes K,T , 4, 5, 45,S4, and S5.
• PLKw cannot define the frame classes D,T ,B, 4, and 5.
• PLKw is less expressive than EL over model classes K,D,B, 4, and 5. It is equally expressive
as EL over T (and classes contained in T , such as S4 and S5).
• We axiomatized the logic of knowing whether with public announcements, PLKwA, and demon-
strated that it is equally expressive as PLKw.
• The axiomatization PLKW for knowing whether logic is equivalent to Ig of [vdHL03], and the
axiomatization PLKWS4 for knowing whether logic over transitive frames is equivalent to LB
of [Ste08].
We continue with ideas on further research.
• To complete the axiomatization spectrum, we want to axiomatize PLKw overD- and B-frames.
We expect similar techniques as in the case of PLKWT to work, while finding the right axioms
may be hard.
• As said, knowing whether seems a natural modality and able to express statements succinctly.
To make this intuition concrete, we conjecture that PLKw over reflexive models is exponen-
tially more succinct than EL if there are at least two agents. The computational complexity of
knowing whether logics is also left for future work.
• The comparison with [Ste08] demonstrates that the same logic may be obtained by different
semantics based on different models. The undefinability of frame properties suggests that the
Kripke semantics may not be the best semantics for knowing whether logic. We intend to
investigate neighbourhood semantics and other weaker semantics for PLKw.
• We consider adding group operators for knowing whether (or ignorance) to the language. There
are various options to define such group operators. Is a group G ignorant of ϕ if, when defining
the accessibility relation for G as the transitive closure of the union of all relations, both a state
where ϕ is true and a state where ϕ is false are group-accessible? Or should all agents consider
states possible where ϕ is true and where ϕ is false, and then we ‘simply’ take Kleene-iteration
of that? There are yet other ways to define group ignorance, and the notion of group ignorance
is under close scrutiny in formal epistemology [Han11, Hen10].
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• We consider adding arbitrary announcement operators [BBvD+08] to knowing whether logic.
One can then express, for example, that after any announcement agent i remains ignorant:
¬Kwiϕ. This addition becomes more challenging if one then removes the announcement op-
erators from the logical language and defines the arbitrary announcement by modally definable
model restrictions.
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A Comparison with [vdHL03]
We first derive auxiliary theorems that will be used in the derivations of the axioms and rules of the
system Ig.
Lemma 48. ⊢PLKW Kwi(χ ∧ ϕ) ∧ Kwi(¬χ ∧ ϕ)→ Kwiϕ.
Proof.
(i) (χ ∧ ϕ)↔ ¬(χ→ ¬ϕ) TAUT
(ii) Kwi(χ ∧ ϕ)↔ Kwi¬(χ→ ¬ϕ) REKw, (i)
(iii) Kwi(χ→ ¬ϕ)↔ Kwi¬(χ→ ¬ϕ) Kw↔
(iv) Kwi(χ ∧ ϕ)↔ Kwi(χ→ ¬ϕ) Sub, (ii), (iii)
(v) (¬χ ∧ ϕ)↔ ¬(¬χ→ ¬ϕ) TAUT
(vi) Kwi(¬χ ∧ ϕ)↔ Kwi(¬χ→ ¬ϕ) (v), Similar to (i)− (iv)
(vii) Kwi(χ→ ¬ϕ) ∧ Kwi(¬χ→ ¬ϕ)→ Kwi¬ϕ KwCon
(viii) Kwi(χ ∧ ϕ) ∧ Kwi(¬χ ∧ ϕ)→ Kwi¬ϕ Sub, (vii), (iv), (vi)
(ix) Kwiϕ↔ Kwi¬ϕ Kw↔
(x) Kwi(χ ∧ ϕ) ∧ Kwi(¬χ ∧ ϕ)→ Kwiϕ Sub, (viii), (ix)
Lemma 49. ⊢PLKW Kwiϕ→ Kwi(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ Kwi(¬ϕ ∧ χ)
Proof.
(i) (ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ ¬(ϕ→ ¬ψ) TAUT
(ii) Kwi(ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ Kwi¬(ϕ→ ¬ψ) REKw, (i)
(iii) Kwi(ϕ→ ¬ψ)↔ Kwi¬(ϕ→ ¬ψ) Kw↔
(iv) Kwi(ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ Kwi(ϕ→ ¬ψ) Sub, (ii), (iii)
(v) (¬ϕ ∧ χ)↔ ¬(¬ϕ→ ¬χ) TAUT
(vi) Kwi(¬ϕ ∧ χ)↔ Kwi(¬ϕ→ ¬χ) (v), Similar to (i)− (iv)
(vii) Kwiϕ→ Kwi(ϕ→ ¬ψ) ∨ Kwi(¬ϕ→ ¬χ) KwDis
(viii) Kwiϕ→ Kwi(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ Kwi(¬ϕ ∧ χ) Sub, (vii), (iv), (vi)
Using these lemmas, we now derive I2, I3, I4 and the rules RI, and Sub in PLKW.
Proposition 50. Axiom I2 is derivable in PLKW.
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Proof. We derive the equivalent equivalent proposition:
⊢PLKW Kwiϕ ∧ Kwiψ → Kwi(ϕ ∧ ψ)
(i) Kwiϕ→ Kwi(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ Kwi(¬ϕ ∧ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)) Lemma 49
(ii) Kwiψ → Kwi(ψ ∧ ϕ) ∨ Kwi(¬ψ ∧ ϕ) Lemma 49
(iii) Kwi(ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ Kwi(ψ ∧ ϕ) TAUT,REKw
(iv) Kwiψ → Kwi(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ Kwi(¬ψ ∧ ϕ) Sub, (ii), (iii)
(v) (¬ψ ∧ ϕ)↔ ϕ ∧ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) TAUT
(vi) Kwi(¬ψ ∧ ϕ)↔ Kwi(ϕ ∧ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)) REKw, (v)
(vii) Kwiψ → Kwi(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ Kwi(ϕ ∧ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)) Sub, (iv), (vi)
(viii) Kwi(ϕ ∧ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)) ∧ Kwi(¬ϕ ∧ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ))→ Kwi¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) Lemma 48
(ix) Kwi(ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ Kwi¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) Kw↔
(x) Kwi(ϕ ∧ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)) ∧ Kwi(¬ϕ ∧ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ))→ Kwi(ϕ ∧ ψ) Sub, (viii), (ix)
(xi) Kwiϕ ∧ Kwiψ → Kwi(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨
(Kwi(ϕ ∧ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)) ∧ Kwi(¬ϕ ∧ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ))) (i), (vii)
(xii) Kwiϕ ∧ Kwiψ → Kwi(ϕ ∧ ψ) (x), (xi)
Proposition 51. Axiom I3 is derivable in PLKW.
Proof. First, we prove that ⊢PLKW Kwiϕ ∧ ¬Kwi(χ1 ∧ ϕ) ∧ Kwi(ϕ→ ψ)→ Kwiψ (⋆).
(i) ¬(χ1 ∧ ϕ)↔ (ϕ→ ¬χ1) TAUT
(ii) Kwi¬(χ1 ∧ ϕ)↔ Kwi(ϕ→ ¬χ1) REKw, (i)
(iii) Kwi(χ1 ∧ ϕ)↔ Kwi¬(χ1 ∧ ϕ) Kw↔
(iv) Kwi(χ1 ∧ ϕ)↔ Kwi(ϕ→ ¬χ1) Sub, (ii), (iii)
(v) Kwiϕ→ Kwi(ϕ→ ¬χ1) ∨ Kwi(¬ϕ→ (χ1 ∧ ϕ)) KwDis
(vi) Kwiϕ ∧ ¬Kwi(ϕ→ ¬χ1)→ Kwi(¬ϕ→ (χ1 ∧ ϕ)) (v)
(vii) Kwiϕ ∧ ¬Kwi(χ1 ∧ ϕ)→ Kwi(¬ϕ→ (χ1 ∧ ϕ)) Sub, (iv), (vi)
(viii) Kwiϕ ∧ Kwi(¬ϕ→ (χ1 ∧ ϕ)) ∧ ¬Kwi(χ1 ∧ ϕ) ∧ Kwi(ϕ→ ψ)
→ Kwiψ Lemma 17
(ix) Kwiϕ ∧ ¬Kwi(χ1 ∧ ϕ) ∧ Kwi(ϕ→ ψ)→ Kwiψ (vii), (viii)
Next, we prove that
⊢PLKW Kwiϕ ∧ ¬Kwi(χ1 ∧ ϕ) ∧ Kwi(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ¬Kwi(χ2 ∧ (ϕ→ ψ))→ ¬Kwi(χ1 ∧ ψ).
23
(i) Kwiϕ ∧ Kwiψ → Kwi(ϕ ∧ ψ) I2
(ii) Kwi(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ Kwi(χ1 ∧ ψ)→ Kwi(ψ ∧ ϕ ∧ χ1) I2
(iii) Kwiϕ ∧ Kwiψ ∧ Kwi(χ1 ∧ ψ)→ Kwi(ψ ∧ ϕ ∧ χ1) (i), (ii)
(iv) Kwi(ψ ∧ ϕ ∧ χ1) ∧ Kwi(¬ψ ∧ ϕ ∧ χ1)→ Kwi(ϕ ∧ χ1) Lemma 48
(v) Kwiϕ ∧ Kwiψ ∧ Kwi(χ1 ∧ ψ) ∧ Kwi(¬ψ ∧ ϕ ∧ χ1)→ Kwi(ϕ ∧ χ1) (iii), (iv)
(vi) Kwi(ϕ→ ψ)→ Kwi((ϕ→ ψ) ∧ χ2) ∨ Kwi(¬(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ χ1) Lemma 49
(vii) Kwi(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ¬Kwi((ϕ→ ψ) ∧ χ2)→ Kwi(¬(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ χ1) (vi)
(viii) Kwi(¬ψ ∧ ϕ ∧ χ1)↔ Kwi(¬(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ χ1) TAUT,REKw
(ix) Kwi(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ¬Kwi((ϕ→ ψ) ∧ χ2)→ Kwi(¬ψ ∧ ϕ ∧ χ1) (vii), (viii)
(x) Kwiϕ ∧ Kwiψ ∧ Kwi(χ1 ∧ ψ) ∧ Kwi(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ¬Kwi((ϕ→ ψ) ∧ χ2)
→ Kwi(ϕ ∧ χ1) (v), (ix)
(xi) Kwiϕ ∧ Kwiψ ∧ ¬Kwi(ϕ ∧ χ1) ∧ Kwi(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ¬Kwi((ϕ→ ψ) ∧ χ2)
→ ¬Kwi(χ1 ∧ ψ) (x)
(xii) Kwi(χ1 ∧ ϕ)↔ Kwi(ϕ ∧ χ1) TAUT,REKw
(xiii) Kwi(χ2 ∧ (ϕ→ ψ))↔ Kwi((ϕ→ ψ) ∧ χ2) TAUT,REKw
(xiv) Kwiϕ ∧ Kwiψ ∧ ¬Kwi(χ1 ∧ ϕ) ∧ Kwi(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ¬Kwi(χ2 ∧ (ϕ→ ψ))
→ ¬Kwi(χ1 ∧ ψ) (xi), (xii), (xiii)
(xv) Kwiϕ ∧ ¬Kwi(χ1 ∧ ϕ) ∧ Kwi(ϕ→ ψ)→ Kwiψ (⋆)
(xvi) Kwiϕ ∧ ¬Kwi(χ1 ∧ ϕ) ∧ Kwi(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ¬Kwi(χ2 ∧ (ϕ→ ψ))
→ ¬Kwi(χ1 ∧ ψ) (xiv), (xv)
Axiom I3 now follows from the two derived theorems by propositional reasoning.
Proposition 52. Axiom I4 is derivable in PLKW.
Proof. A stronger result
⊢PLKW ¬Kwiχ→ ¬Kwi(χ ∧ ψ) ∨ ¬Kwi(χ ∧ ¬ψ)
follows directly from Prop. 48.
Proposition 53. Inference rule RI is admissible in PLKW.
Proof. Suppose that ⊢ ϕ. By NECKw we get ⊢ Kwiϕ. We only need to show ⊢ ¬Kwiχ→ ¬Kwi(χ ∧
ϕ), equivalently, ⊢ Kwi(χ ∧ ϕ) → Kwiχ. From the supposition ⊢ ϕ, it follows ⊢ ¬ϕ → ¬χ. Then
using NECKw again, we get ⊢ Kwi(¬ϕ → ¬χ). By Axiom KwCon, we have ⊢ Kwi(¬ϕ → ¬χ) ∧
Kwi(ϕ → ¬χ) → Kwi¬χ, thus by MP we get ⊢ Kwi(ϕ → ¬χ) → Kwi¬χ. Note ⊢ Kwi(χ ∧ ϕ) ↔
Kwi(ϕ→ ¬χ) and ⊢ Kwiχ↔ Kwi¬χ can follow from Kw↔. Therefore ⊢ Kwi(χ ∧ ϕ)→ Kwiχ, as
desired.
Proposition 54. Sub is admissible in PLKW.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Prop. 16.
B Comparison with [Ste08]
We prove that our PLKWS4 and Steinsvold’s LB are equivalent. We first show that the axioms and
rules of the system LB are all derivable or admissible in PLKWS4. We also use that Kwiϕ∧Kwiψ →
Kwi(ϕ ∧ ψ) is derivable in PLKW (see Prop. 50).
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Proposition 55. N, Z, R are derivable in PLKWS4.
Proof. By TAUT, NECKw, Kw↔ and Prop. 50.
Proposition 56. WM is admissible in PLKWS4.
Proof. Suppose that ⊢ Kwiϕ ∧ ϕ→ ψ. From the supposition and NECKw, we have ⊢Kwi(Kwiϕ ∧
ϕ → ψ). By ⊢ Kwi(Kwiϕ ∧ ϕ → ψ) ∧ Kwi(Kwiϕ ∧ ϕ) ∧ (Kwiϕ ∧ ϕ) → Kwiψ (Axiom KwT), we
get ⊢ Kwi(Kwiϕ ∧ ϕ) ∧ (Kwiϕ ∧ ϕ)→ Kwiψ. Besides, from Axiom wKw4 we infer that ⊢ Kwiϕ→
KwiKwiϕ∧Kwiϕ. With Prop. 50 we have ⊢ KwiKwiϕ∧Kwiϕ→ Kwi(Kwiϕ∧ϕ). Now we conclude
that ⊢ Kwiϕ ∧ ϕ→ Kwiψ, as desired.
Now we will prove that LB can derive PLKWS4. Comparing the two systems, we only need
to show that the axioms KwCon, KwDis, KwT, and wKw4, and the rules NECKw and REKw can be
derived in LB. In the following derivation by ⊢ we mean ⊢LB.
Lemma 57. If ⊢ Kwiϕ ∧ ϕ→ ψ, then ⊢ Kwiϕ ∧ ϕ→ Kwiψ.
Proof. This is immediate from the rule WM.
Proposition 58. KwCon is derivable in LB.
Proof.
(i) ((χ→ ϕ) ∧ (¬χ→ ϕ))↔ ϕ TAUT
(ii) Kwi((χ→ ϕ) ∧ (¬χ→ ϕ))↔ Kwiϕ Sub, (i)
(iii) Kwi(χ→ ϕ) ∧ Kwi(¬χ→ ϕ)→ Kwi((χ→ ϕ) ∧ (¬χ→ ϕ)) R
(iv) Kwi(χ→ ϕ) ∧ Kwi(¬χ→ ϕ)→ Kwiϕ Sub, (ii), (iii)
Proposition 59. KwDis is derivable in LB.
Proof.
(i) ϕ→ (¬ϕ→ χ) TAUT
(ii) Kwiϕ ∧ ϕ→ (¬ϕ→ χ) (i)
(iii) Kwiϕ ∧ ϕ→ Kwi(¬ϕ→ χ) Lemma 57, (ii)
(iv) ¬ϕ→ (ϕ→ ψ) TAUT
(v) Kwi¬ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ→ Kwi(ϕ→ ψ) (iv), Similar to (i)− (iii)
(vi) Kwiϕ ∧ ¬ϕ→ Kwi(ϕ→ ψ) (v),Z
(vii) Kwiϕ→ Kwi(ϕ→ ψ) ∨ Kwi(¬ϕ→ χ) (iii), (vi)
Proposition 60. KwT is derivable in LB.
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Proof.
(i) ϕ ∧ (ϕ→ ψ)→ ψ TAUT
(ii) Kwi(ϕ ∧ (ϕ→ ψ)) ∧ (ϕ ∧ (ϕ→ ψ))→ ψ (i)
(iii) Kwi(ϕ ∧ (ϕ→ ψ)) ∧ (ϕ ∧ (ϕ→ ψ))→ Kwiψ Lemma 57, (ii)
(iv) Kwiϕ ∧ Kwi(ϕ→ ψ)→ Kwi(ϕ ∧ (ϕ→ ψ)) R
(v) Kwiϕ ∧ Kwi(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ϕ ∧ (ϕ→ ψ)→ Kwiψ (iii), (iv)
(vi) ¬(ϕ→ ψ)→ ¬ψ TAUT
(vii) Kwi¬(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ¬(ϕ→ ψ)→ Kwi¬ψ (vi), Similar to (i) − (iii)
(viii) Kwi(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ¬(ϕ→ ψ)→ Kwiψ (vii),Z
(ix) Kwiϕ ∧ Kwi(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ϕ ∧ ¬(ϕ→ ψ)→ Kwiψ (viii)
(x) Kwiϕ ∧ Kwi(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ϕ→ Kwiψ (v), (ix)
Proposition 61. wKw4 is derivable in LB.
Proof.
(i) Kwiϕ ∧ ϕ→ Kwiϕ TAUT
(ii) Kwiϕ ∧ ϕ→ KwiKwiϕ Lemma 57, (i)
(iii) Kwi¬ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ→ Kwi¬ϕ TAUT
(iv) Kwi¬ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ→ Kwiϕ (iii),Z
(v) Kwi¬ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ→ KwiKwiϕ Lemma 57, (iv)
(vi) Kwiϕ ∧ ¬ϕ→ KwiKwiϕ (v),Z
(vii) Kwiϕ→ KwiKwiϕ (ii), (vi)
Proposition 62. NECKw is admissible in LB.
Proof. Suppose that ⊢ ϕ, we need to show ⊢ Kwiϕ. From the supposition follows that ⊢ ϕ ↔ ⊤,
then by Sub we get ⊢ Kwiϕ ↔ Kwi⊤. By N and TAUT, we have ⊢ Kwi⊤, and hence we conclude
that ⊢ Kwiϕ.
Proposition 63. REKw is admissible in LB.
Proof. Immediate from Sub.
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